The second Nagorno-Karabakh war played into Russia's hands perfectly, despite their apparent lack of involvement in the war itself, how? I spoke with Mr Farid Shafiyev, author, ex-ambassador and Chairman of the Centre for Analysis of International Relations to learn more about the conflict (interview below)
On the 27th September 2020 war broke out in the Caucasus. A decades-long conflict was thawed as Azerbaijan’s military pushed into the officially Azeri, yet Armenian held, regions of Nagorno-Karabakh. Less than a month and a half later, the war was over, a ceasefire was brokered, and Azerbaijan emerged the clear victor having retained the majority of its territories captured during the conflict. Turkey supported Azerbaijan, diplomatically advocating for Baku’s right to regain control of its official territories, its support was unsurprising; Both countries are highly similar, having been referred to as “One nation with two states”, owing to the majority of Azeris (a Turkic ethnic group) that make up the population within Azerbaijan. Turkey was always going to try and protect the interests of the Azeri people, it’s role in the conflict was instrumental in ensuring that Azerbaijan was victorious by supplying arms, including highly effective TB2 drones, to the country. Whilst Turkey supported Azerbaijan in all the possible ways it could, Russia, unexpectedly, remained largely impartial.
This impartiality is uncharacteristic of Russian foreign policy which, throughout the last two decades, has been focused on ensuring its influence and interests in former Soviet Socialist republics are protected, exemplified in its invasions of Ukraine and Georgia. It seemed as though Armenia and Azerbaijan would be no different, with Russia highly interested in the region, “they perceive [the Caucasus] as their region of historic presence”, explains Farid Shafiyev, chairman of the Centre for Analysis of International Relations, “they have this post-imperialist vision that the whole of that area should be under their umbrella”. It was expected that increased Turkish presence would threaten this precious Russian influence, especially since both countries hold strained relations, supporting opposing sides in both the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, giving Russia reason to involve itself in the war. Moscow had reason to support Armenia since both are allies and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) which promises that an act of aggression against one state will be perceived as an act of aggression against all. It was therefore also thought that Russia would be obligated to aid Armenia, a longstanding ally and member of the CSTO, against an invasion by a non-member state – Azerbaijan. Yet, Russia did little to support Armenia, it chose impartiality, with the reason lying in a simple 19th century political theory.
Realpolitik, a term coined by German politician Ludwig von Rochau in the 19th century is, today, used simply to describe foreign policy that places national interest above all else. Realpolitik has been employed countless times over the years, most significantly in the Obama administration’s decision to not deploy troops to Syria, because whilst “it sounded like the right thing to do, it was going to be impossible to do on the cheap”. Just as, economically, US military involvement in Syria made little sense for the Obama administration, changing circumstances meant Russian involvement in the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict would not be in Russian interests. Moscow had to base its foreign policy on the pragmatic principles of Realpolitik as opposed to flexing its military muscles and looking to support its allies as it had done in the past.
Economically, heavy support for Armenia was not in Moscow’s interests; recession in Russia caused by the COVID-19 pandemic meant that Moscow had to focus on pumping money into its economy as opposed to supporting foreign wars. The result of supporting Armenia would have forced Russia to engage in hostilities with what has become the dominant economic power of the Caucasus – Azerbaijan - with a GDP of $48.1 billion that dwarfs both that of Armenia ($13.7 billion) and Georgia ($17.7 billion). A lack of military support for Armenia ensured Russian relations (and trade) with an arguably more important regional power were kept intact, an important assurance in difficult economic times. Russia was able to kill two birds with one stone as, despite Russia’s apparent disregard for the interests of its long-time ally Armenia, Yerevan is still somewhat dependant on Moscow for both trade and security, even more so after the war crippled its military ability and its economy. Russia can therefore retain Armenia as a strong ally whilst simultaneously improving relations with the more important trading partner of Azerbaijan.
Strategically, the apparent lack of bias Russia exhibited throughout the war gave Moscow the advantage of having a significant role to play in brokering the peace deal, with Putin being the sole signatory of the ceasefire beyond the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia was therefore able to dictate much of the final agreement, forcing concessions on both sides and cementing its relevance in the region as a peacemaker because of this newfound impartial image. Before the conflict, the lack of a Russian military presence in Azerbaijan meant that there was greater room for regional powers, like Turkey, to manoeuvre, yet Russian involvement in the peace agreement meant this would no longer be the case. As stated in the agreement, Moscow was able to deploy 2000 peacekeepers to the area over 16 observation points, whilst simultaneously thwarting Turkish plans to deploy its own troops. The deployment of these peacekeepers to Azerbaijan cemented Russia’s position as regional hegemon as it became the only power to hold troops in every country in the Caucasus. This increased influence is likely long lived; The open-ended nature of the peace agreement, which left the status of disputed territories vague, and barely touched upon the fate of refugees, shrouded the long-term status of the conflict in uncertainty. This uncertainty places Russia in a position of increased power, with the greatest military presence in the area and an asserted role as ‘peacemaker’ to the region, it has the ability to shape and influence the future geopolitical landscape to best suite Moscow and its interests. Since the peace agreement, minor skirmishes have already broken out along the line of contact, should a more major incident occur in the future, or even war break out again, Moscow is now in the strongest economic and strategic position to influence the outcome in its favour.
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