Delving into the tug of war during 2014 and 2015.
Ukraine has a history as a buffer state between the known East and West, a melting pot or middle ground in which tensions between the Western and Eastern Hemisphere tend to be unloaded. Due to its geographical situation it is very susceptible to influence and pressure from either side; buffer states such as these tend to represent which of the greater powers holds most control and dominance in the foresaid rivalry. Considering Ukraine’s recent independence in 1991 and the growing tensions between Russia and NATO, it is not so surprising to see such a territorial and aggressive move by Putin annexing Crimea in February 2014. Ukraine underwent several processes of Russification dating as far back as the 18th century with Catherine the Great, the abolishment of the Hetmanate institution and its regiments constituted as an action against a Ukrainian autonomy. Stalin then further limited Ukraine linguistically, which as we will see had a major impact in its political division, and then forced a Ukrainian famine through socioeconomic collectivisation policies in 1932 claiming the lives of 3.9 million. The extensive variety of these policies show why Russia was able to take Crimea with such ease and little resistance of eastern Ukrainians, of which the Russian language dominates the Eastern region by 92.7% and the Southern microregion by 84.5%. To understand Ukraine’s situation, it is necessary to delve into its western and eastern influence, and the conflict that unravelled in Crimea and Donetsk in 2014.
The conflict in the Donbass region of Ukraine was built up over centuries and ignited by Viktor Yanukovych’s commitment to Moscow by his refusal to sign the EU’s association agreement. It represented Ukraine conforming to EU trade regulations and consumer standards in return for economic and political support, meaning Ukraine would be turning its back on Russian relations. Due to Putin’s anti-west rhetoric shifts in his campaign, American involvement further heightened tensions and turned the conflict into a fight for dominance in the east and the west. When the treaty, which had been built on for over for two decades, was scrapped protests and riots broke out in Kiev on February 18th. In 2014 protests turned deadly and led to further retaliation from Eastern Ukraine. With the ensuing chaos and the annexing of Crimea, Pro-Russian separatists seized the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk declaring themselves as independent states. With the eruption of this Ukrainian revolution, the two groups LDR (Luhansk People’s Republic) and DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic) seized the areas; it was later proven by NATO that Russia was providing military aid to the rebels, a claim that Russia denies. The two ‘terrorist’ organisations led by Igor Plotnitsky and Alexander Zakharchenko, continued to fight in the Donbass along the frontline. Though Russia denied their assistance of these two groups, they even began recognising identification documents issued by these groups as being legitimate. With the death toll rapidly climbing up to 13,000 and 3,353 civilians murdered, the MINSK protocol agreement was introduced. The agreement was drawn up by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, which consisted of representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, a group established in June 2014 as a way to facilitate dialogue and the resolution of the strife cross Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Four meetings took place with informal representatives of Donetsk and Luhansk and the cease-fire agreement was signed on September 5th, 2014. After violations and a follow-up memorandum, a second battle of Donetsk Airport broke out in which the two parties continued to accuse eachther of violations of the peace treaty. Fighting only truly subsided with the agreed MINSK II agreement which came into effect on February 15th, 2015, after almost a year of destruction, this was Ukraine’s final attempt at stopping it. The history of Donbass within that year truly demonstrates how passionate Ukrainians were in their revolution, willing to sacrifice their life in order to escape tyrannical leadership from the East.
A very similar conflict arose in the more southern peninsula of Ukraine, Crimea. A historically turbulent and grey border was annexed between February and March 2014 by the Russian Federation. Following Pro-Russian demonstrations in the Crimean city of Sevastopol, on February 27th masked Russian troops without insignia took over the supreme council and captured vital territory. The Russian government was set up by Aksyonov in which they conducted a referendum and declared independence on March 16th, 2014. The annexation was of course condemned as a violation of international law and the safeguarding of Ukraine’s territorial integrity however, the UN is yet to act fearing causing a larger war between Russia and other countries. This annexation must be viewed firstly by considering the political, linguistic and geographical divides that existed in Ukraine that we touched upon previously. Following his rigged re-election, Putin switched his rhetoric into anti-western paranoia and the demonisation of Western leaders, further building upon the prevalence of cultural divides which had been present in Ukraine for so long. In this manner the annexation of Crimea was not only an act of territorial aggression but also one for his approval ratings in Russia which shot up after this. His popularity rose and the Russian population stopped questioning the democracy of his leadership; Putin became addicted to this feeling which led him to back pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, a move which did not turn have effective results. On the other hand, the Russo-Ukrainian tensions were expressed differently with Ukraine’s interest in wanting to join NATO. With the political elite viewing NATO as an acute threat to Russian militarily and politics, it was inevitable for Ukraine to run up against the countervailing power, hence the delaying of the EU association agreement. However, due to the large leverage Russia holds over Ukraine with gas deliveries and other commodities, Kiev has to avoid sudden action to prevent intense tariffs and barriers on trade. Therefore, in the longer term, Ukraine must adopt a gentle lean towards the West through active diplomacy and by exploring alternative institutional arrangements for European security in the meantime.
To conclude, the violence in Ukraine from 2013 to 2015 was a manifestation of the tensions between the East and the West of an extremely divided country. As Ukraine began to lean towards Europe, Russia forced aggression to gain popularity and to continue pushing their anti-western agenda through the buffer state of Ukraine, which tends to represent which side holds more political influence. What we can expect from Ukraine in the future is a slow Westernisation and cultural shift within the country, we can already see that from 2014 to 2017, polls by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation showed a jump from 50% to 69% in regard to support for NATO. However, it seems to be that for the meantime Crimea will remain a part of Russia due to fears of further conflict.
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